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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to explain and analyze the sweeping regulatory legislation known as 
“The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,” commonly known as the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 1  In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, which shook the economy and 
plunged it into a deep recession, it became apparent that the framework of the financial regulatory 
system was not only in need of repair work, but in some places significant restructuring.2  In recognition 
of the failings of the financial regulatory environment, the United States government responded with 
the Dodd-Frank Act to restructure the regulatory system as well as restore market and consumer 
confidence.3  
In this paper I will discuss the major objectives of the act and address a few challenges the policy 
faces in its attempt to restructure the financial regulatory system.  At the heart of these objectives is the 
need to repair the financial regulatory system so that it can better provide financial stability to the 
overall economy.  The challenge presented to regulators is deciding which of the goals of a good 
financial system to focus on.4  Innovation and competitiveness would be better accomplished with less 
regulation whereas safety and soundness are better guaranteed with stricter regulations.5  The choices 
policy makers and regulators must make will depend on what they value more.6  
The objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act are “to promote financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too-big-to-fail,’ to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, 
                                                          
1
 “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,’’ United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. (2010).  (PDF version).   
2
 Matthew Richardson, “Regulating Wall Street:  The Dodd-Frank Act,” Economic Perspectives no. 3 (2012):  85.  
Matthew Richardson is a chaired professor at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University. 
3
 Zsuzsánna Biedermann, “The History of American Financial Regulation,” Public Finance Quarterly 57 no. 3 (2012):  
324. 
4
 Viral V.Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew P. Richardson, and Ingo Walter, Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-
Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance (Hoboken: Wiley, 2010). 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Robert E. Krainer, “Regulating Wall Street:  The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance,” 
(Review), Journal of Financial Stability 8 no. 2 April (2012):  122. 
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and for other purposes.”7  First, in this paper I describe how the act plans to address these objectives by 
restructuring the financial regulatory framework and setting in motion regulations designed to improve 
the stability of the overall financial system.  Second, I will discuss a few of the market failures that 
exacerbated the financial crisis and contributed to the damages the nation is still trying to recover from.  
Third, I will discuss some of the market and government failures that will continue to challenge the 
financial regulatory system.  Fourth, I will present a few recommendations for consideration. 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Dodd-Frank Act aims to restructure financial regulation in response to the events of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.  In order to put Dodd-Frank into an understandable context it is important 
not only to understand the events that led up to the crisis but to also understand some of the changes 
that have been made over time to financial regulation in America.   First, in response to the Panic of 
1907, where a liquidity crisis swiftly turned into a solvency crisis, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland 
Act which examined possible solutions to address the need for emergency capital.8  Three years later, 
based on the recommendations set before Congress from the Aldrich-Vreeland report, Congress 
enacted on December 22, 1913 the Federal Reserve Act, thereby creating the Federal Reserve System 
with powers to expand credit and currency.9   
Second, in the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 Congress enacted the U.S. Banking 
Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act.  The intention of this bill was “[t]o provide for 
the safer and more effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the 
undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other purposes.”10  It separated 
commercial (deposit-taking and lending) from investment (underwriting and trading business) banking.11    
One of the market failures that the Glass-Steagall Act addressed was moral hazard, as Biedermann helps 
                                                          
7
 “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.’’  
8
 Richardson, 91.   
9
 Ibid., 91. 
10
 The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  New York Federal Reserve.  (PDF version).   
11
 Krainer, 122. 
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to explain: “[t]he Act was meant to prevent banks from drifting near bankruptcy by foolhardily risking 
clients’ money, since if a bank catering to small depositors is having liquidity troubles; the state often 
undertakes to help out financially in order to protect the interests of the aforementioned small 
depositors.”12  According to Robert E. Krainer, “[w]here the [Glass-Steagall Act] broke down was in the 
regulatory capture following the oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s which in turn resulted in high 
inflation and interest rates and facilitated the growth of shadow banks in the form of money market 
mutual funds.”13  Shadow banks did not accept deposits; therefore they were not considered traditional 
banks and were therefore not subject to regulation.14  
Third, after years of contention over deregulation between Washington and the financial 
industry the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as The Financial Services Modernization Act) was 
signed into law on November 12, 1999 by President Bill Clinton.15  The legislation effectively repealed 
the two “anti-affiliation provisions” of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that separated commercial from 
investment banking and also brought an easing to the overall financial regulatory environment.16  It 
cleared the way for the creation of financial conglomerates, which some felt were needed to be 
competitive globally.17  Commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies 
were allowed to merge, eventually becoming known as “too big to fail” financial institutions.18  
However, these conglomerates built themselves up, constituting moral hazard because they were 
secure in the knowledge they were so systemically important that the government would not let them 
fold.19  
 
                                                          
12
 Biedermann, 313. 
13
 Krainer, 122. 
14
 Investopedia US, A Division of ValueClick, Inc.  "Investopedia."  
15
 Biedermann, 314. 
16
 Douglas J. Elliot, “Structuring Finance to Enhance Economic Growth and Stability.” Brookings Institution (2013):  
1-18.   
17
 Biedermann, 315. 
18
 Ibid., 314. 
19
 Ibid., 315. 
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FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-2009 
 In order to evaluate the Dodd-Frank Act it is also important to understand the events and 
market failures that led to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.  What went so wrong that 
necessitated legislation to change the way the regulatory system worked?  Legislation that has the 
potential not only to change the way the financial industry does business, but also could have long-
lasting effects on the economy. 
Robert M. Solow begins the tale by explaining a “modern capitalist economy with a modern 
financial system could probably adapt to minor shocks—positive or negative—with just a little help from 
monetary policy and mostly automatic fiscal stabilizers”; however, “that same financial system has 
intrinsic characteristics that can make it self-destructively unstable when it meets a large shock.”20  
These characteristics that Solow refers to are a series of market failures that contributed to a perfect 
storm that brought the financial system into a state of crisis.  Solow describes these two major sources 
of market failures as asymmetric information and systemic risk.21   
First, asymmetric information allowed some market participants to know things that others did 
not, adding to an imbalance in the structure of securities that were so “complicated and opaque” that 
almost no one in the market understood the implications.22   Furthermore, insiders had an exploitable 
advantage and incentive to turn their knowledge into profit.23  Second, systemic risk was created by 
huge financial institutions raising incredible sums of credit in ways that endangered the whole system, 
“without anyone taking account of, or feeling responsible for, the system wide effects.”24  It was this 
combination of conditions that set the stage for a great fall.  Another key actor in the financial crisis of 
                                                          
20
 Robert M. Solow, “How to Understand the Disaster,” The New York Review of Books 56 no. 8 (2009).  1987 Nobel 
laureate. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
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2007-2009 was the principal role of leverage, which “turns large banks and financial institutions into 
ninepins that cannot fall without knocking down others that cannot fall without knocking down still 
others.”25   
With the goal of mitigating risk by diversifying investment portfolios, asset-backed mortgages 
with varying degrees of risk were being bundled into securities and sold as investment instruments.  This 
popular strategy, known as securitization, was “intended as a way to transfer credit risk to those better 
able to absorb losses, but instead it increased the fragility of the entire financial system by allowing 
banks and other intermediaries to ‘leverage’ up by buying one another’s securities.”26  Basically the 
financial industry was involved in one enormous carry trade, where one can purchase investments that 
yield a higher rate of return than it costs to borrow the funds.27  
As the financial crisis unfolded it became obvious that numerous financial institutions were 
doing the exact same thing: they had all leveraged themselves into dangerously vulnerable positions to 
make risky investments.28  With the start of the housing market decline, the collateral backing these 
assets became toxic.29  So begins the downward spiral, as Robert M. Solow explains: 
All those banks and others [that are highly leveraged and stuck with toxic assets of uncertain 
value] are now unwilling to lend to one another because they fear that the potential 
borrower is already broke and will be unable to repay.  And so the credit markets freeze up 
and ordinary businesses that need credit for ordinary business purposes find that they 
cannot get it on any reasonable terms.  This is what happened in September 2008 when the 
commercial paper market—the market for daily business borrowing—creased to work.  The 
breakdown of the financial system exacerbates the recession; many who want to buy or build 
cannot get credit with which to do so.  The recession then endangers the solvency of more 
financial and nonfinancial borrowers and worsens the state of the financial system.30 
The events that occurred during the financial crisis led Washington and its policy makers to respond with 
a sweeping regulatory system overhaul.  At the bottom of the business cycle, they were forced to 
                                                          
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Anne M. Khademian, “The Financial Crisis:  A Retrospective,” Public Administration Review November/December 
(2011):  843. 
27
 Frederic S. Mishkin, “Over the Cliff:  From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 25 no. 1 (2011):  55. 
28
 Solow.  
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
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recognize the system’s failures and respond with much stricter rules which tend to be costly to comply 
with.  If this is the response at the bottom of a business cycle, what happens at the top?  
Enter stage right, a villain in this tragedy known as Cyclical Euphoria.   According to Raghuram G. 
Rajan there were many to blame for the financial crisis of 2007-2009.   However, he points to the top of 
the business cycle and the euphoria generated by the “prosperity and growth of a boom” as the main 
culprit.31  Chuck Prince, chairman of Citigroup said:  “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things 
will be complicated.  But, as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We’re still 
dancing.”32  In a sense, all the players were caught up in the music and nobody was willing to stop and 
think about it ending.  Rajan further illustrates his point by stating: 
Politicians have an incentive to ride the boom, indeed to abet it, through the deregulation 
sought by bankers.  After all, bankers have not only the money to influence legislation but 
also the moral authority conferred by prosperity.  And what of regulators?  When everyone is 
‘for’ the boom, how can regulators stand against it?  They are reduced to rationalizing why it 
would be technically impossible for them to stop it.  Everyone is therefore complicit in the 
crisis because, ultimately, they are aided and abetted by cyclical euphoria.33  
The business cycle plays an undeniable role in the course of all financial activity.  It is a process that 
repeats itself, moving from top (booms) to busts (bottom) and back up again.  Depending on where the 
market is, in relation to the business cycle, will affect policy decisions because of the pressure put upon 
policy makers to either provide safety and stability or allow innovation and competitiveness.34   
 
 
DESCRIBTION OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010 
                                                          
31
 Raghuram G. Rajan, “The Credit Crisis and Cycle-Proof Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 
September/October (2009):  397.  Raghuram G. Rajan was the Eric Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of 
Finance at the Booth School of Business, University of Chicago and is currently the Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
India. 
32
 Ibid., 399. 
33
 Rajan, 400.  Quoted Chuck Prince. 
34
 Acharya et al.  
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The act begins with a short list of goals:  “an act to promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices, and for other purposes.”35   The act is immense and far-reaching, consisting of 2,319 pages, 
covering 16 titles, and now including over 243 (and counting) rules that stem from 11 separate 
government agencies.  The act is considered to be an ambitious and momentous effort to remake the 
financial sector; its impact is felt not only by every part of the financial industry but also by all 
corporations and consumers as well.36  
Some of the most noteworthy changes pertaining to the act’s aim of improved oversight and 
concern over systemic risk are (1) the creation of a new council, the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSCO) to give regulators new monitoring and resolution authority, (2) changes to the Federal Reserve, 
including an added mandate to provide financial stability, and (3) the creation of a new Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection.37  To date the act is only partially in effect because some rules have yet 
to be completed and implemented.  The act’s effectiveness continues to be contested strongly not only 
by politicians, financial industry leaders and an active, well-financed lobby, but also by economists and 
academics.  Some are afraid the act goes too far, yet others argue it does not go far enough and will not 
protect against another financial crisis.  Proponents believe the new rules will help prevent another 
crisis, whereas detractors argue that the act will slow future economic growth.38  
Simply put, the conflict in opinion stems from an inability to achieve all the fundamental goals 
for a sound financial system at the same time.  Without a doubt difficult choices have to be made.  
According to the authors of Regulating Wall Street:  The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of 
Global Finance there are four basic goals for a good financial system:  (1) Encourage innovation and 
                                                          
35
 “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.’’  
36
 Khademian, 841. 
37
 William Sweet, “Dodd-Frank Act Becomes Law,” The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and 
Financial Regulation, (2010). 
38
 Steven J. Markovich, "The Dodd-Frank Act," Council on Foreign Relations (July 2012).   
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efficiency; (2) provide transparency; (3) ensure safety and soundness; and (4) promote competitiveness 
in global markets.39  Robert Krainer, in his review of Regulating Wall Street agreed and pointed out that 
“[o]bviously these conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously and the choices that will be made will 
depend on the weight given to each of the four by regulators at a given point in time.  For example, at 
present regulators put a heavy weight on safety and soundness and this could compromise the criteria 
of innovation and global competitiveness.”40   Imagine a scale, one side represents safety and soundness 
and the other side innovation and competitiveness.  I would argue that it is important to strive for 
balance among these goals to provide an environment that is safe, yet still encourages growth and 
competition.  Regulations should not be so strict that it prohibits market activity nor should it be so 
loose that market activity has the potential to bring financial chaos.   
In the following section I discuss how the Dodd-Frank Act addresses the underlying causes of the 
crisis by modernizing the regulatory framework as well as examine some further challenges that still face 
us. 
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR OBJECTIVES 
First, in this section I describe how the Dodd-Frank Act plans to address its objectives by re-
structuring the financial regulatory system and to set in motion regulations designed to improve stability 
of the financial marketplace, as well as to address the issue of systemic risk.  I also discuss in greater 
detail the intention of the act to correct perceived failures and to highlight some of the challenges in 
achieving the act’s stated goals.  Second, I discuss the impact the act has had on the economy thus far.  
Third, I discuss the challenges that will continue on despite the efforts of regulatory reformation. 
Promote the Financial Stability by Improving Accountability and Transparency in the Financial 
System:  At the heart of the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act is the desire to promote a safe and stable 
financial system.  The major market failure that came into the spotlight during the financial crisis was 
                                                          
39
 Acharya et al.  
40
 Krainer, 122. 
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systemic risk and how it endangered the financial industry and the whole American economy.  In order 
to achieve this goal, not only must the act address issues that affect the overall system but also 
individual firms, therefore necessitating the need for macro- and microprudential regulation.  From the 
macroprudential prospective the act addresses the need for financial stability (1) with the creation of a 
new consultative group of financial regulators, and (2) by reforming the Federal Reserve. 
First, as Robert Krainer explains, “the Dodd-Frank solution to the problem of systemic risk relies 
on the judgment of wise men and women…this wise judgment takes the form of creating a Financial 
Stability Oversight Council” (FSOC).41  The FSOC has 10 voting members (who provide the expertise of 
federal and state regulators, plus an insurance expert) and five nonvoting members (who serve in an 
advisory capacity only).42  It is the FSOC’s responsibility to detect emerging risks that have the potential 
to threaten the financial system and its stability and to encourage market discipline.43  In support of the 
FSOC’s role the act also created another new agency, the Office of Financial Research (OFR) under the 
auspices of the Department of the Treasury.  This new agency is responsible for collecting financial data 
and conducting economic analysis for the FSOC.44  Financing for this research center will come from fees 
assessed on systemically important financial companies (SIFIs).45  
The FSOC has the authority to “make recommendations about appropriate macroprudential 
regulation, to collect information about market activities, and to designate systemically important 
institutions or activities that will come under the oversight of the Federal Reserve as the systemic risk 
regulator.”46  The Council’s format brings together key regulatory agencies in a manner as to contribute 
to public policy.  Their powers include: 
                                                          
41
 Krainer, 123. 
42
 Douglas D. Evanoff and William F. Moeller, "Dodd-Frank: Content, Purpose, Implementation Status, and Issues," 
Economic Perspectives 3Q (2012): 77. 
43
 Ibid., 77. 
44
 United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010). 
45
 Krainer, 124. 
46
 Evanoff and Moeller, 77. 
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• Making “recommendations to the Federal Reserve for increasingly strict rules for capital, 
leverage, liquidity, risk management and other requirements as companies grow in size and 
complexity, with significant requirement on companies that pose risks to the financial 
system.” 
• Designating “a nonbank financial company be regulated by the Federal Reserve if the council 
believes there would be negative effects on the financial system if the company were to fail 
or if its activities would pose a risk to the financial stability of the U.S.” 
• “Break[ing] up large complex companies” if a company poses a grave threat to overall 
financial stability. 47   
 
The FSOC, with the assistance of the Office of Financial Research will determine threats of systemic risk 
and then recommend action to the suitable regulatory agency to take the necessary steps in order to 
preserve the stability of the financial system.48  Therefore, the FSOC acts like an early warning system.  
Whether they will be successful or not depends on their ability to monitor the whole financial system in 
a very comprehensive manner.49   
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act reforms the Federal Reserve by limiting its emergency lending 
authority, by expanding other powers, and by assigning it a new mandate:  preserving the stability of the 
U.S. financial system.50   The act, in order to support of the new mandate, created the position of “vice 
chairman for supervisions” to serve the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and to report to Congress semi-
annually.51  The new position is to be filled by appointment of the President and subject to Senate 
confirmation.52  Over three years have passed since The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law, yet this 
position remains to be filled.   
The act allows for expansion of the Fed’s power to “better capture and regulate institutions and 
activities that can threaten the stability of the financial system.”53  Previously, the Fed acted only as the 
supervisor of bank holding companies; now it has been granted increased authority over their banking 
                                                          
47
 United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs.  
48
 Krainer, 124. 
49
 Evanoff and Moeller, 75-84. 
50
 Krainer, 122. 
51
 Ibid., 122. 
52
 Ibid., 122. 
53
 Evanoff and Moeller, 79. 
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and nonbanking subsidiaries.54  It will also have authority over savings and loan holding companies 
which used to be under the purview of the now defunct Office of Thrift Supervision.55  In addition, the 
Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Fed to supervise nonbank financial institutions (investments banks and 
insurance companies for example) if the FSOC deems any to be of systemic importance.56   
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the Fed to enforce greater prudential standards, including 
higher capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements according to the recommendations of the FSOC.57  In 
addition, all SIFIs must develop orderly resolution plans, otherwise known as “living wills” in order to 
liquidate with the least amount of systemic impact.58  If a firm’s resolution plan is determined jointly by 
the Fed and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to be unsound then the Fed has the authority 
to set stricter requirements and also restrict growth and limit specific activities.59  The SIFI then has two 
years to submit a credible resolution plan; failing that, the Fed has the authority to designate the SIFI as 
a grave threat to financial stability.60  At which point the FSOC, with a two-thirds vote, has the authority 
to require the offending company to divest.61 
The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to improve financial stability through bold changes to the financial 
regulatory system; however these changes will also bring to light further challenges and potential 
problems.  Major changes have occurred with the Federal Reserve, specifically the expansion of 
authority which brings into question the significance of this increased power and influence.  
Traditionally, the central bank’s independence has proven to be key in controlling inflation.  The Federal 
Reserve was originally intended to serve as a “decentralized, joint banking venture, reined-in by checks 
                                                          
54
 Bernard Shull, “The Impact of Financial Reform on Federal Reserve Autonomy,” Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College (2012):  6. 
55
 Ibid., 6-7. 
56
 Ibid., 7. 
57
 Ibid., 7. 
58
 Ibid., 7. 
59
 Ibid., 7. 
60
 Ibid., 7-8. 
61
 Ibid., 8 
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and balances within, and overseen, but not managed, by the government.62  The changes to the Federal 
Reserve leaves a lot of questions unanswered because the consequences of these changes have yet to 
be revealed.  In the meantime the question of the central bank’s independence is important and has 
everyone wondering about the impact of these changes.   
One such unconventional measure, for example, was the Fed’s effort to increase liquidity 
through swap lines with foreign central banks.63   These central banks, needing to create liquidity for 
their financial institutions (that required dollar funding) swapped their currencies with the Fed for 
dollars in unlimited amounts.64  According to the Federal Reserve’s minutes of the October 29-30, 2013 
meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee this supposedly temporary measure was turned into 
standing arrangements.65  The Associated Press explained the action as follows:  “Six of the world’s 
leading central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, say they will provide each other with ready 
supplies of their currencies on a standing basis, extending arrangements set up to steady the global 
financial system during post-2007 turbulence.”66  Originally the action was adopted as a temporary, 
emergency operation, but now has become a permanent rule which some question the wisdom of 
because lack of accountability at the Fed.67   
Another criticism in the wake of the financial crisis deals with the rule of law.  The Fed created a 
special-purpose vehicle, Maiden Lane LLC I, to take toxic assets totaling $30 billion from Bear Sterns to 
sweeten the deal for the JPMorgan Chase’s acquisition.  Then it created Maiden Lane LLC II & III to buy 
and hold more toxic assets from AIG Insurance in an effort to shore it up from collapse.  According to 
Lawrence H. White “[t]here was no precedent, and no apparent legal authority in the Federal Reserve 
                                                          
62
 Shull, 4. 
63
 Frederic S. Mishkin, “Over the Cliff:  From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 25 no. 1 (2011):  60. 
64
 Ibid., 60. 
65
 Pam Martens, “Fed Minutes Reveal a Dangerous Power Grab by New York Fed,” Wall Street on Parade Blog 
(2013). 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Ibid. 
Hartch 13 
 
Act, for such special-purpose funding operations.”68  The Fed failed to uphold the rule of law by not 
following the law as written, in a predictable manner and in accordance with established precedent.69  
End Too-Big-To-Fail and Taxpayer Bailouts: According to Mark Van Der Weide, a Senior 
Associate Director of the Federal Reserve System, taking on “too-big-to-fail” and threats to financial 
stability should be the central goals of the Dodd-Frank Act.70   As far as Van Der Weide is concerned, in 
order to protect financial stability we must address the problems with “systemically important financial 
institutions”; however, he is quick to point out that “systemic risk can certainly be generated, and 
propagated outside of our largest financial firms.”71  He warns that systemic risk can reach across 
financial sectors with similar funding patterns that can easily be underestimated as risk, especially 
during cyclical euphoria.72  Another danger comes from what Van Der Weide describes as “systemic 
herds,” a collection of firms such as money market mutual funds that individually many not be systemic 
but are collectively.73    
Martin J. Gruenberg, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) describes a 
potential SIFI: 
It is likely to be a firm with several business lines—perhaps commercial banking, capital 
markets, global asset management, and transaction services—and which operates across 
national borders.  The corporate structure is likely to be a holding company with a parent at 
the top and multiple layers of subsidiaries.  The number of subsidiaries will be in the 
hundreds, if not thousands.  It is also likely that the structure of the legal entities within the 
company will not be aligned with the business lines.  Additionally, intra-company and 
financial relationships will not be transparent.74 
With that description one can begin to better understand the level of complexity when dealing with the 
corporate structure of a SIFI and what it might take to break such a firm apart. 
                                                          
68
 Lawrence H. White, “The Federal Reserve and the Rule of Law, Testimony before the House Committee on 
Financial Services,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University (2013). 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Mark Van Der Weide, “Implementing Dodd-Frank:  Identifying and Mitigating Systemic Risk,” Economic 
Perspectives no. 3 (September 2012): 108. 
71
 Ibid., 108. 
72
 Ibid., 108. 
73
 Ibid., 109. 
74
 Martin J. Gruenberg, “Implementing Dodd-Frank:  Orderly Resolution,” Economic Perspectives no. 3 (September 
2012):  99. 
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Unfortunately, due to previous bail-outs, such as the rescue of Continental Illinois National Bank 
in 1984 and the consequent bail-outs that resulted from the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, there exists a 
precedent which results in an implicit government guarantee.75   The implicit guarantee in itself 
constitutes a moral hazard and reduces market self-discipline.76   Evanoff and Moeller further point out 
that SIFIs “obtain a comparative advantage in the marketplace as a result of their perceived “too-big-to-
fail status,” which lowers the risk premiums on their debt instruments.”77  Another concern is the issue 
of inter-connectedness and its implication that it is not how large a financial institution is but how it is 
connected to other institutions, the threat being should one fail the potential exists for others to fail, 
basically triggering a domino effect of default, as became apparent with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008.   
The first line of defense provided by The Dodd-Frank Act is the creation of the Financial 
Oversight Board, which has the power to designate financial and nonfinancial institutions as SIFIs.  Once 
designated as systemically important, SIFIs come under the Federal Reserve’s jurisdiction for stricter risk 
management, plus additional restrictions and requirements for liquidity and leverage.78  Second, the act 
requires that SIFIs submit a “living will,” the basic plan for a rapid and orderly shutdown should the   
company default.79  Evanoff and Moeller, explain the challenge of inter-connectedness and the purpose 
of a living will: 
One of the major problems with resolving a large financial institution is the complex 
interconnectedness of the various elements of the organization.  Affiliates and subsidiaries 
may be legally structured in a manner to achieve certain corporate objectives such as tax 
avoidance or regulatory arbitrage that may make the resolution process more difficult.  With 
a living will in place, regulators can work with the SIFIs to restructure the organization and 
avoid these difficulties should resolution become necessary.  Generally, the living wills are 
intended to provide the resolution authority with critical information on the firm’s 
organizational structure to aide in the resolution process.80   
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The nature of interconnectedness among financial institutions poses a threat to the overall system if 
even one SIFI should fail.  The “living will” theoretically acts as a deterrent and is an attempt at cycle-
proof regulation that Raghuram G. Rajan discussed in his paper.81  
  But what if, despite all efforts to the contrary, a SIFI should fail?  Recognizing that danger the 
Dodd-Frank Act proposes to eliminate “too-big-to-fail” and taxpayer-funded bailouts with an alternative 
failure resolution process known as the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).82   The Act confers the 
authority of OLA via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to dismantle a failing SIFI.83  
As explained by Evanoff and Moeller, the Secretary of the Treasury decides if a SIFI is in danger 
of default, then makes the recommendation as to whether or not the FDIC should take the company 
into receivership.84  Once this process is initiated the Dodd-Frank Act imposes significant restrictions: 
• The management and board of directors that were responsible for the failure of the firms must 
be removed. 
• The priority of claims in the resolution process should be adhered to in allocating firm losses—
equity holders will not receive anything until all the other creditors, including the FDIC, have 
been repaid. 
• The FDIC will not take an equity position with the failing firm. 
• No taxpayer funds are to be used to prevent the firm from being liquidated.  Instead, the 
industry, perhaps through special assessments, will incur any losses from the resolution 
process.85 
 
This extreme resolution process, it is hoped, will act as a deterrent in itself since it basically proposes 
nationalization of the SIFI as the FDIC acts to dismantle and liquidate assets. 
Martin J. Gruenberg of the FDIC acknowledges that the resolution of such large financial firms with 
complex corporate structures differs greatly from the resolution process of a single insured bank and 
proposes that by placing only the parent holding company into receivership would lessen the likelihood 
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of “disruption and loss of franchise value” if the inter-relationships among the subsidiaries were to 
cease.86  Also Gruenberg points out that there has been a concerted effort to provide market 
accountability in that the new resolution authority does not protect creditors or counterparties by 
providing insurance or credit protection against potential losses.87 
Furthermore, the new resolution authority comes with access to a new source of liquidity support 
provided by the Dodd-Frank Act:  the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), located in the Treasury 
Department.88   The FDIC can borrow funds from OLF to assist in the liquidation procedure and to cover 
any losses incurred during the resolution process.89  Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that 
direct spending for potential liquidation activities, including recoveries from the sale of assets but 
excluding revenues from assessments will be $26.3 billion through 2020.90  The revenues mentioned 
here would come from fees assessed among the remaining SIFIs in the industry.  Basically they will be 
penalized for the failure of one another. 
The Committee on Financial Services acknowledged that even though the act claims to end bailouts 
of “too-big-to-fail” firms, the act nevertheless grants the FDIC permission to borrow taxpayer funds in 
the form of allocations set aside specially for the OLF with the intention of paying off creditors of any 
failed SIFI.91  The majority recommended repealing OLA; however, the minority concluded that to repeal 
the OLA “would expose the economy to additional uncertainty and instability.”92   It is important to note 
that the FDIC has yet to finalize all the rule making that would affect the process of its receivership of a 
failing SIFI. 
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Consumers and Investors Protection:  In light of the moral hazard and asymmetrical information 
failures, the Dodd-Frank Act created another new agency called the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).  This new agency has “the authority to ensure American consumers get the clear, 
accurate information they need to shop for mortgages, credit cards, and other financial products, and 
protect them from hidden fees, abusive terms and deceptive practices.93  CFPB merges consumer 
protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of 
Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union 
Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Federal Trade 
Commission.94 
The new agency deals with predatory lending practices and misleading products, as well as 
imposing particular underwriting standards, requiring that firms performing securitization retain at least 
5 percent (considered “skin in the game”) of the credit risk and increase rating agency regulations.95  
CFPB is an independent entity located within and funded by the Federal Reserve.  Robert Krainer stated 
that it is typical for financial crises to bring to light a number of “sharp, if not outright fraudulent 
practices” and the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was no exception.96  Such practices came from 
contractual terms of mortgages that included 2/28 adjustable rates and prepayment fees for example.97  
There were abuses with payday loans as well as hidden credit card fees.98   CFPB now has the authority 
to regulate firms that previously never were, such as consumer reporting agencies, debt collection 
agencies and payday lenders.99  
Additionally, CFPB has the authority to regulate a number of consumer financial products (but 
not all) that formerly were under the control of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and the Office of the 
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Comptroller of the Currency as well as prohibit and establish penalties for unfair lending practices.100  
The Committee on Financial Services reported that CFPB “has successfully recovered hundreds of 
millions of dollars for consumers from credit card companies and debt relief services through its 
enforcement authority and working with state attorneys general.”101  It is hoped that this new agency 
will continue to provide needed consumer protection but more time and studies are needed to ascertain 
a cost-benefit analysis to determine its effectiveness. 
 
IMPACT 
 It has been over six years since the beginning of the financial crisis and over three years since 
the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted.  So what impact has Dodd-Frank had on the economy?  The answer to 
that question is debatable because one of the act’s greatest challenges to being effective is its slow rate 
of implementation.  Not all of the rules have been implemented and some have yet to be developed and 
proposed.  As of November 1, 2013 only 162 of the 398 (41%) total rulemaking requirements have been 
achieved, 110 (28%) of the 398 total rulemaking requirements have missed their deadlines and 60 out of 
398 (15%) had deadlines to submit proposals for new rules but missed them.102  The remainder (17%) 
have deadlines that fall into the future.103 
Delays in the implementation of the many rules continue to expose the economy to the very 
dangers the Dodd-Frank Act is supposed to prevent.  Having the policy fully implemented is essential as 
it stands now it is hard to evaluate the act’s full impact on the financial industry.  David L. Weimer and 
Aidan R. Vining explain that “[a]dopted policies gain force through implementation.”104  They also refer 
to Eugene Bardach’s metaphor for implementation:  the process of assembling and keeping in place all 
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the elements needed for a machine.105  If the Dodd-Frank Act is like a machine, then it is missing some 
vital parts!  The authors take the metaphor a little further by discussing design, an important element to 
function, and compare it to theory:   
Of course, just as a machine may not work as intended if its design is flawed, a policy based 
on an incorrect theory may also produce unintended consequences.  Yet, an effective design 
(correct theory) is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a working machine 
(effective policy).  If necessary parts (essential policy elements) are either not available or 
unreliable, then the machine (policy) will not work effectively.106 
I would argue since such radical changes have been wrought under the Dodd-Frank Act that the “design” 
or theory being applied have yet to be fully tested.  All the pieces of the machine have yet to be put 
together to see if it can function as intended.  Weimer & Vining make one more important point:  “The 
essence of the implementation problem lies in the distribution of necessary elements.  The greater the 
potential for either persons or organizations to withhold necessary contributions, the greater is the 
possibility of failure.”107  Unfortunately the task being given the regulators will be a very lengthy process.  
As Evanoff and Moeller point out “…many parts of Dodd-Frank Act lack specificity as to how they are to 
be implemented, giving regulators significant discretionary authority to develop and implement 
rules.”108  
Regarding the act’s impact on the overall economy, the Executive Office of the President 
painted an optimistic picture when its report “The Financial Crisis:  Five Years Later” was published in 
September 2013:  
America has fought our way back. Because of these tough choices, over the past three and a 
half years, our businesses have created seven and a half million new jobs. Manufacturers are 
adding jobs for the first time since the mid-1990's. We generate more renewable energy 
than ever, and our exports are at all-time highs. Health care costs are growing at the slowest 
rate in 50 years – and our deficit has fallen by 50% since the President took office. Through 
Wall Street Reform, the President has laid the foundation for a better future.  The passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act has strengthened the recovery and helped prevent a future crisis, 
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implementing some of the strongest Wall Street reforms and consumer protections in our 
nation’s history.109 
However, the United States Department of the Treasury’s report, “The Financial Crisis Five 
Years Later - Response, Reform, and Progress” (dated September 2013) came with a more 
realistic nod to the work yet to be done and a warning: 
As we approach the five-year anniversary of the height of the crisis, the financial system is 
safer, stronger, and more resilient than it was beforehand.  We are still living with the 
broader economic consequences, and we still have more work to do to repair the damage. 
But without the government’s forceful response, that damage would have been far worse 
and the ultimate cost to repair the damage would have been far higher. The financial crisis 
reminds us that we must remain vigilant to emerging risks in the system. The financial system 
is dynamic and firms are innovative.  And as sources of risk change, regulation and oversight 
must keep pace.110 
 
The consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 were severe.  The country plummeted into a deep 
recession which it is still trying to recover from, 8.8 million jobs were lost and $19.2 trillion (in 2011 
dollars) household wealth disappeared.111  In addition, the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) stated in 2013 that “[s]tudies estimating the losses of financial crises based on lost output 
(value of goods and services not produced) suggest losses associated with the recent crisis could range 
from a few trillion dollars to over $10 trillion.”112  The GAO report also acknowledged that “[s]ome 
studies suggest the crisis could have long-lasting effects: for example high unemployment, if persistent, 
could lead to skill erosion and lower future earnings for those affected.”113  
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported the trend for the labor force participation rate is 
even more worrisome with the population age 16-44 declining and age 55 and over increasing.  While 
unemployment has declined to 7.3 percent from its October 2009 peak of 10 percent, it is still too high, 
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and long-term unemployment and its consequences remain a concern.114   The indications of the current 
state of the economy, though improving, predict a very slow pace of recovery. 
Challenges to Financial Stability Will Continue Under the Dodd-Frank Act 
In this section I discuss the failures that will pose continued challenges to the financial industry 
despite or because of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Until the act’s rulemaking process has been completed and 
the act has been fully implemented the financial system is still at risk from adverse effects of negative 
shocks.  The greater worry, of course, is that even a fully implemented act will not be enough to stave 
off another economic downfall, in light of a weakened economic environment.  Additionally, it must be 
recognized that the act is failing sufficiently to address critical failures at play, such as systemic risk, 
moral hazard, and asymmetrical information. 
Systemic risk: The market failure that became a critical problem during the financial crisis was 
systemic risk, and yet it remains a very real threat despite the efforts of the Dodd-Frank Act thus far.  
The problem is that individual firms have little to no incentive to manage themselves for systemic risk.115  
The Dodd-Frank Act’s solution helps to deal with the cost of the negative externality of systemic risk by 
imposing stricter regulations and setting in place a resolution process, but not all the rules are in place 
to handle this eventuality yet.  The act, in my opinion, does not allow for sufficient market self-discipline 
and correction.  There is not enough “skin in the game” to discourage the unintended consequence of 
moral hazard.   
Moral hazard:  This is an insidious and prevalent problem.  With the creation of ‘too big to fail’ 
institutions built themselves up secure in the knowledge that due to their significance the government 
would not allow them to fall.116  There was no market correction for excessive risk-taking among these 
firms.  This is still a troubling problem, as Richard W. Fisher noted:  “[t]here is a great deal of moral 
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hazard at all levels of decision-making in our current financial system.”117  Unfortunately the moral 
hazard problem remains, insidious and prevalent.  The other areas that the act could help improve have 
yet to be determined by the finalized rules such as the credit rating agencies and O-T-C derivatives. 
Asymmetrical information:  This problem will continue to be challenging due to its relationship 
with the moral hazard issue.  There will always be some who have insider information; however, what 
they choose to do with advantageous information is a matter of ethics and contributes to moral hazard 
when choices are made for profit’s sake without any consideration to the overall safety of the financial 
system.   
 Mispriced government guarantees:  This is a term coined by Matthew Richardson which 
describes what he considers to be mispriced government guarantees in the financial system, “such as 
deposit insurance, too-big-to-fail subsidies, and government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt 
subsidies.”118  Unfortunately, one of the unintended consequences of federal guarantees is that they 
encourage imprudent risk taking, which ultimately may lead to instability in the very system that the 
safety net is designed to protect.119   
Regulatory/Political Capture:  Due to the nature of how the government functions individuals 
with the responsibility to address problems in the financial industry will inadvertently find themselves 
under the influence and pressure of interest groups.  These interest groups have specific agendas and 
will attempt to wield their power on decision makers in order to further their aims.  The financial 
industry has a very wealthy, well-connected financial lobby that favors less regulation and oversight and 
has been very active in voicing its opinions to policy makers and regulators.  According to Simon 
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Johnson, it is working at “convincing people that more finance is good, more unfettered finance is 
better, and completely unregulated finance is best.”120  
ALTERNATIVE POLICY IDEAS & STRATEGIES 
 In this section I discuss some alternative policy ideas and strategies that academics and 
economists are contemplating and debating.  One strategy I highly recommend was proposed by   
Raghuram G. Rajan, a theory he terms “Cycle-Proof Regulation.”121  He warns that “we reform under the 
delusion that the regulated –and the markets they operate in—are static and passive and that the 
regulatory environment will not vary with the cycle.”122  At the bottom of the cycle we tend to over 
regulate, and at the top, conversely, we tend to deregulate—“to the point of maximum danger to the 
system.”123  Ergo, any policy idea or strategy should take into consideration the nature of the business 
cycle.  In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act did exactly that with the ‘living will’ requirement of the new SIFI 
resolution process. 
Larry Summers, former U.S. Treasury Secretary stated that “you should take the moment of 
crisis and seize it as an opportunity to clean up and fix the financial system, addressing the underlying 
incentive problems that brought forth the crisis.”124  He also stated “that no sustainable financial system 
could be based on the expectation of unconditional bailouts.  The big banks today, I can assure you, 
have an expectation of bailouts without any conditions.”125  Much more work needs to be accomplished 
in regards to addressing the incentives that led to the financial crisis and the idea of taxpayer bailouts 
must be eliminated.  Firms acting in risky investment strategies must be held accountable for the threat 
they pose to financial stability. 
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According to Richard W. Fisher, the financial system is very lopsided, with less than a dozen 
banking conglomerates controlling up to nearly 70% of the assets in the banking industry.126  
Unfortunately the threat of systemic risk remains and has the potential to sow catastrophic financial 
disaster, not only to the U.S. economy but to the global economy as well.  The interconnectedness of 
these financial institutions is a global phenomenon.   
The Volcker Rule, an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act attempted “to separate financial 
intermediation in both its commercial and investment banking functions from the more speculative 
business of proprietary trading, and ownership in both hedge funds and private equity funds,” but 
through the political process ended up being weakened into only “limitations placed on banks engaging 
in these trading activities and that limitation was spread out up to 7 years in the future.”127  After it 
became apparent that the Volcker Rule would not succeed in reigning back big banks and in light of their 
continued threat of systemic risk, another policy proposal entered the arena for deliberation, “down-
size mega banks.”128  Richard Fisher, of the Dallas Federal Reserve proposes that “too-big-to-fail” 
financial institutions be restructured into multiple business entities.”129  As he explains it, “only the 
resulting downsized commercial banking operations—and not shadow banking affiliates or the parent 
company—would benefit from the safety net of federal deposit insurance and access to the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window.”130  He believes that it is vital to address institutional size in order for the 
threat of failure to be believable; this would allow for marketplace discipline.  As Fisher describes, 
“knowing where the federal government guarantees begin and end would properly realign incentives 
and reinvigorate a degree of creditor discipline that has been dormant at large, complex financial 
institutions for far too long.”131  
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 Another proposal is that systemic risk should be treated like a negative externality.  The full 
costs of an externality are not borne by parties in the transaction unless there are markets to 
appropriately price the externality.132  Typically, the markets for externalities are missing (think of 
carbon emissions, for example) and so, to, is the invisible hand operating through price to produce 
externalities at the efficient level.133  According to the authors of Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank 
Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance “[e]conomists’ preferred solutions to this kind of market 
failure are generally to employ what are called Pigouvian taxes.134  The authors maintain “[s]uch taxes 
are usually the least invasive way to remedy a market failure, because they do not require heavy-
handed government intervention into the specific decisions made by households and firms.  In the 
context of the financial crisis, these would take the form of taxes on financial firms that rise with their 
systemic risk contributions.”135  Further they point out that the tax would provide revenue for the 
government to reduce other taxes or contribute to the costs dealing with SIFI resolutions.136 
CONCLUSION 
 It has been six years since the financial crisis began in 2007 and three years since policy makers 
responded by enacting the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 in hopes of addressing the problems of a broken 
financial regulatory system which were revealed in the aftermath of the crisis.  Most importantly, the act 
is an effort to provide the public with peace of mind, that the government was willing and able to 
respond to the crisis and will see to financial stability in the future.  But does the act really accomplish 
this?   
At this moment in time, I do not believe it does.  If it is to be believed that the crisis resulted 
primarily from reckless behavior of the world’s largest banks then they clearly remain a threat.  It has 
yet to be determined if the partially enacted Dodd-Frank Act will provide enough disincentive for these 
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large, complex institutions to curb systemically threatening activity.  I would argue that this is not the 
case because there remains an implicit guarantee that any failing SIFI would not be allowed to fail, that 
the government will step in to prevent a total collapse.  To date, the FSOC is compiling an ever growing 
list of not only financial SIFIs but also other nonfinancial institutions that they deem a potential threat.  
The restrictions they will enforce on these entities will eventually be very strict, but until all the rules are 
finalized it cannot yet be determined if the act will have a positive or negative impact.  If the restrictions 
are too strict, not only the industry, but the overall economy suffers.  Then there will be tremendous 
pressure on law makers to roll back regulations again to a degree that can be dangerous.   
It is hoped that even though the Dodd-Frank Act was all about putting out fires, it still has the 
intention and potential to restructure the financial system for the better.  However, its complexity and 
rate of implementation might be its undoing.  In the meantime, efforts to change or influence the rule 
making process are well under way.  Political and regulatory agency capture will have a toll on the 
ultimate effectiveness of this act. 
A concerted effort must be made going forward to provide a regulatory framework that is less-
susceptible to the business cycle’s whim.  The system must be flexible enough in the highs and lows of 
‘boom and bust’ cycles that it can provide enough freedom for growth yet restrain markets just enough 
so they do not cause catastrophic harm.  All efforts should be made for market participants to be 
accountable and responsible for their actions.  If they choose to perpetrate risk at levels that threaten 
the overall economic well-being of this country they should pay a price for that choice, not be offered 
guarantees of financial support.   And regulations must endeavor to find the right balance in order to 
offer safety and stability yet encourage innovation and growth.   
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